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STATE V. REEVES: INTERPRETING LOUISIANA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY.
The process of defining and developing rights of privacy has been,
until recently, the province of the United States Supreme Court
through its interpretation of the Bill of Rights. In the area of elec-
tronic surveillance, a right of privacy has been inferred from the fourth
amendment's protection from unreasonable search and seizure to
preclude warrantless wiretapping. This right, as interpreted by the
Court in Katz v. United States,1 was premised on the theory that "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places"2 and that those mat-
ters which an individual seeks to preserve as private are often the
proper subject of constitutional protection.8 Katz left unresolved the
issue of whether the same right of privacy extends to conversations
in which an individual voluntarily discloses incriminating information
to another party who is concealing a bugging device. In this situation
the individual's intent to preserve the privacy of his words is less
obvious than in the case of wholly external wiretapping. The Supreme
Court faced the problem in United States v. White' and found that
the right guaranteed by the fourth amendment is not broad enough
to protect an individual from the possibility that those with whom
he converses might be equipped with a monitoring device.
The decision in White has been regarded by some state courts
as one more instance in which the United States Supreme Court has
been unwilling to read certain protections into the Bill of Rights that
appear consistent with the Court's prior opinions.5 As a result, a
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1969).
2. Id. at 351.
3. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .... But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected." Id.
4. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
5. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1975) (the California Supreme Court, dissatisfied with the minimum standards concern-
ing search incident to arrest described in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973), held that the California Constitution provided greater protection than the fourth
amendment); State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620 (Me. 1972) (the Maine Supreme Court con-
sidered the proof required to establish the admissibility of a confession alleged to
be obtained illegally; the court rejected Lego v. Twomney, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), which
accepted the standard of "preponderance of evidence" instead of "without a reasonable
doubt"); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (the New Jersey Supreme
Court chose a higher standard for determining voluntariness in consent searches than
the fourth amendment standard of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973));
Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974) (the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court found that the right to counsel under the Pennsylvania Constitution attached
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renewed interest has developed in looking to state constitutions as
an alternate basis for providing greater protections in state court
criminal procedure.' In the recent case of State v. Reeves,7 the Loui-
siana Supreme Court considered the issue of one party consensual
surveillance in light of article I, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion of 1974, the state provision analogous to the fourth amendment.
On original hearing, the court determined that the provisions of arti-
cle I, section 5 were broader in their protection of individual privacy
than the fourth amendment, and that the warrant requirement ap-
plied to all instances of government electronic surveillance.' The court
reversed itself on rehearing, however, and finally concluded that
although textual differences in article I, section 5 require a type of
analysis distinct from the fourth amendment, the Louisiana Constitu-
tion does not provide greater protection from consensual bugging than
the United States Constitution.
The two opinions produced by the Louisiana Supreme Court's con-
sideration of State v. Reeves raise two distinct issues. First, Reeves
fosters a reexamination of the right to protection from electronic bug-
ging and the appropriateness of the limitation on the right imposed
by the United States Supreme Court. Second, the Louisiana Supreme
Court's willingness to read broader substantive guarantees into the
Louisiana Constitution poses the question of when and by what pro-
cess a state court should refer to its own constitution to supplement
or extend the body of rights provided by the United States Constitu-
tion. To determine which, if either, of the court's resolutions of these
issues is the most desirable, an initial examination must be made of
at arrest, as opposed to indictment or arraignment as prescribed by the United States
Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)). In several instances, the New
Jersey Supreme Court expressed its determination to overrule state court decisions
which read Bill of Rights guarantees more broadly than the United States Supreme
Court. See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973) (retroactivity of North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (self-incrimination);
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (sixth amendment right to confrontation). For
a general discussion of this topic, see Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights
in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976).
6. See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978); State v. Sarmiento, 397 So.
2d 643 (Fla. 1981); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975); State v.
Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978). See generally Wilkes, The New Federalism
in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974);
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489 (1977).
7. 427 So. 2d 403 (La. 1983).
8. The case was originally heard by a court that included three justices ad hoc.
The court voted six to one, with one regular justice dissenting. On rehearing, all three
absent justices voted with the one original dissenter to reverse.
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the theoretical bases for interpreting state constitutions and their im-
plementation in Louisiana and other states. Likewise, a review of
fourth amendment jurisprudence is necessary to clarify the federal
constitutional standards and identify any perceptible conflicts. Having
established an evaluative background, an analysis may be made of
the methodology used in Reeves, both on original hearing and rehear-
ing, to ascertain the correctness of attributing to article I, section
5 a protection of privacy interests greater than the fourth amendment.
INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The idea of finding in state constitutions an untapped source of
civil liberties might have seemed superfluous to defense lawyers ten
years ago. During the years when the United States Supreme Court
was systematically incorporating most of the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, the
need to go elsewhere than the United States Constitution to support
a claim of violation of personal freedoms was hardly apparent. The
intervening ten years, however, have seen a considerable decrease
in the Court's enthusiasm for extending constitutional protections in
the area of criminal procedure.' However one views the Court's most
recent philosophical bent, it is clear that, for the moment, the freedom
with which the Court had previously interpreted the Constitution with
respect to civil liberties has been sharply curtailed."0 Given this change
of mood on the Court, it is easy to speculate that, in the near future,
appeals urging extension of established doctrines will meet with
diminishing success."
In response to this trend, an increasing number of cases are be-
ing argued in state appellate courts on both federal and alternative
state constitutional grounds. The reasoning behind such a "dual rights"
9. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Salvucci,
448 U.S. 83 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143 (1972); cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (extending fourth amend-
ment protection to all warrantless arrests in homes); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972) (requiring a speedy trial); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (extending
right to counsel).
10. Se Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300 (1973) (limiting right to counsel at post-indictment photographic display as guaranteed
by United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (cutting back on the self-incrimination rule
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). See generally Howard, supra note 5, at
873; Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Con-
stitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297 (1977).
11. See, Preface to L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at v (1978).
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approach is simple -if the decision is ultimately based on a state con-
stitutional provision, it is not subject to review by the United States
Supreme Court. 2 The Supreme Court has observed that "a State is
free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police
activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal con-
stitutional standards."'" Given a state court's ability to interpret its
constitution in a manner broader than the United States Constitu-
tion, an inquiry must be made into the history and purpose of state
constitutional interpretation in order to determine when it is ap-
propriate or desirable for a state court to do so.
To understand fully the role of state constitutions as guarantors
of civil liberties, it is necessary to place them in their historical
perspective. The guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights all had
antecedents in one or more state or colonial constitutions.' Historically,
state constitutions which accorded state citizens the same personal
freedoms that the Bill of Rights later guaranteed at a national level
were already in place at the time the federal constitution was enacted.
As one commentator has tersely observed, "Far from being the model
for the states, the Federal Bill of Rights was added to the Constitu-
tion to meet demands for the same guarantees against the new cen-
tral government that people had secured against their own local
officials."' 5 Only when the Supreme Court began to broaden the
12. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). "This court from the time of its founda-
tion has adhered to the principle that it will not review judgments of state courts
that rest on adequate and independent state grounds.... Our only power over state
judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights."
Id. at 125-26 (emphasis added).
13. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
14. The following provisions of state constitutions of the Revolutionary era em-
body fundamental liberties later incorporated in the federafBill of Rights, as discussed
in F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES, Now OR HERETOFORE FORM-
ING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1909). MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1776), art. VIII
(freedom of speech), art. XIX (right to counsel, confrontation, and speedy trial by an
impartial jury), art. XXIII ("[A]ll warrants, without oath or affirmation ... are illegal
..... ); 3 F. THORPE, supra, at 1686-88. MASS. CONST. of 1780, Declaration of Rights, art.
XIV ("Every subject has a right to be secure from all- unreasonable searches, and
seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions ... ."); 3 F.
THORPE, supra, at 1891. N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVI (right to trial by jury); 5 F. THORPE,
supra, at 2597-98. PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. X (right to be free from
warrantless searches and seizures); 5 F. THORPE, supra, at 3083. For a brief analysis
of the bills of rights in the Southern states during the Confederation and early National
eras, see generally F. GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC
STATES, 1776-1860 (1930).
15. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering The States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT.
L. REV. 379, 381 (1980).
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substantive rights found in the Bill of Rights and to apply them to
the states through the fourteenth amendment, did the state constitu-
tion assume a secondary function. Once a broad rule had been
established under the federal constitution, state courts had no need
to look to a state constitutional provision to infer the same right."6
In a sense, then, the role of the state constitution has been somewhat
cyclical: its original role as the prime guarantor of state citizens' rights
was slowly overtaken and subsumed by the rapid expansion of federal
constitutional law, and now, arguably, the state constitution is
re-emerging as a source of new freedoms and rights.17
The extent to which state constitutions should be viewed as the
primary source of individual rights or as mere refinements on the
broad base of federal constitutional protections must be determined. 8
Acceptance of the former view implies interpretation of state con-
stitutions independently from and without reference to the federal
Constitution. 9 Several problems are inherent in this "primacy model"
approach. Although the federal scheme theoretically permits the states
to be the primary source of individual rights," the history of civil
liberties over the last fifty years has been the history of the federal
Constitution. Many of the basic rights which state courts now
customarily read into their constitutions are the products of federal
constitutional interpretation.2' The theory that state constitutions are
primary and self-sufficient sources of individual rights ignores the
reality of federal constitutional hegemony; additionally, such an ap-
proach disregards the importance of the federal constitutional juris-
prudence as guiding principles for state constitutional interpretation.'
16. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial for serious
crimes); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in all criminal
cases); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (the exclusionary rule). Neither could a state
court interpret its constitution more narrowly than the federal constitution, since this
would be in violation of the supremacy clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
17. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); People v. Ander-
son, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972); State v. Sarmiento, 397
So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981); State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978). For
a detailed discussion of the re-emergence of state constitutions, see Developments in
the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
18. See Developments, supra note 17, at 1356.
19. See Linde, supra note 15, at 383.
20. This could occur whenever the state court wished to extend rights beyond
the basement of federal constitutional rights. See id.
21. An example is the exclusionary rule. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
22. Often a state's bill of rights may contain articles which are quite similar to
the analogous provisions of the Bill of Rights. For example, in Louisiana's Declaration
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Finally, the "primacy model" does not reflect the most significant
limitation on state constitutional interpretation: under the fourteenth
amendment's notion of due process, the Bill of Rights serves as a foun-
dation of individual rights, a set of standards below which state con-
stitutions cannot fall. Clearly, state constitutions cannot be viewed
in total isolation from their federal counterpart.
An alternative method of state constitutional interpretation is one
wherein state courts accord a fundamental role to the United States
Constitution and seek, in selected instances, to extend the state con-
stitution's protections beyond those of the federal constitution. This
approach has been referred to as an interstitial model28 because it
recognizes the role of the state constitutions as one of gap-filling, that
of extending state protections into areas where the United States
Supreme Court has declined to extend a prior doctrine or create a
new rule which would have uniform nationwide application. State con-
stitutions could play a useful role in the development of individual
rights in this manner for several apparent reasons. Unlike the federal
Constitution, which must be interpreted so as to achieve realistic
nationwide standards and at the same time express a concern for state
autonomy, a state constitution is more susceptible of experimentation
in the form of increased personal freedoms. The smaller size of state
jurisdictions, coupled in most cases with the fact of an elected
judiciary, tends to make state courts more responsive to public feel-
ing. More importantly, since most state constitutions are amended
more easily than the federal Constitution, the popular will of the elec-
torate can override clearly opprobrious or unpopular constitutional
interpretations. Finally, state constitutions may contain more explicit
guarantees than the analogous federal provisions in order to reach
interstices in federal law that state constitutional drafters considered
deserving of protection. If an appropriate function of state constitu-
tions is to add to the basement of rights presently applied to the states
by federal constitutional law, the guidelines which a state court should
use in expanding the reach of its constitutional provisions beyond the
federal counterparts need to be determined. Clearly, some of the
divergence between state and federal judges will be based on differ-
ing values and social policy choices. Nevertheless, to avoid the
appearance of arbitrarily second guessing the Supreme Court and to
ensure effectiveness as a workshop for the refinement of civil liber-
of Rights, (LA. CONST. art. I), section 2 (the due process clause) and section 3 (equal pro-
tection) were taken from the language of the fourteenth amendment; section 5 is nearly
identical to the fourth amendment; sections 6 and 11 parallel the second amendment;
sections 7, 8 and 9 incorporate the rights guaranteed by the first amendment.
23. See Developments, supra note 17, at 1356.
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ties, a state court should consider the following factors, in varying
degrees, in deciding whether to reach an interpretation different from
the federal Constitution.
First and foremost, a state court should examine the textual pro-
vision itself; often state constitutions contain provisions which are
analogous to the Bill of Rights but include additional or different
language which may be grounds for a different interpretation.2' An
example of such a textual difference occurs in article I, section 5 of
the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, which provides for automatic stand-
ing in the case of possessory offenses. The Louisiana Supreme Court
has considered the provision several times, 5 indicating that the state
constitution grants a procedural right that the United States Supreme
Court recently declared to be unavailable at the federal level."
Closely aligned with consideration of a constitution's text is the
need to examine a provision's legislative history, as well as relevant
state history and traditions, which might assist a court in understand-
ing the functions which the constitutional provision was intended to
serve. A state court is on much more defensible footing when its in-
terpretation is based on clear textual differences and a legislative
record reflecting the intent of the drafters to give the provision as
broad a reach as that given by the court.
When a state court is interpreting a provision analogous to an
identically worded federal constitutional guarantee, the grounds for
divergence become less a matter of legislative intent and more a mat-
ter of policy choice. The most obvious legislative inference would be
that the state provision was intended to mirror the antecedent federal
provision. In this situation, however, a state court may be dissatisfied
with the result achieved by the federal court's interpretation of the
federal provision and may desire to rewrite the Supreme Court opin-
ion by basing the opinion on the state constitution. While this type
of state constitutional interpretation has been labeled "evasive" by
its critics" insofar as it often seeks to avoid conservative opinions
24. See FLA. CONST. art. I, S 12 (1968, amended 1982) ("No warrant shall be issued
except upon probable cause ... describing . .. the communication to be intercepted
. .. ); MONT. CONST. art. II, S 10 ("The right of individual privacy is essential to the
well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a com-
pelling state interest." This right is in addition to section 11, which tracks the fourth
amendment.).
25. See State v. Boyd, 359 So. 2d 931 (La. 1978); State v. Hutchinson, 349 So. 2d
1252 (La. 1977); State v. Culotta, 343 So. 2d 977 (La. 1976).
26. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
27. See generally Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation,
22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981).
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by the Supreme Court, it is certainly the legitimate function of a state
court to be the final judge of that state's constitution. If, in fact, as
Justice Brandeis suggested, states are "to serve as a laboratory ...
and try novel social and economic experiments," 8 a state court must
occasionally reject the philosophy articulated by its federal counter-
part in favor of its own considered opinion. The problem with state
court interpretation of this type, if conducted too frequently, is that
it creates varying standards - a problem common enough when only
one court's determinations must be followed.29 In this respect, inter-
pretation of state constitutional provisions identical to federal provi-
sions arguably should be limited to those situations in which the Supreme
Court has withdrawn from prior expansive interpretations,3° or in which
there are clear flaws or inconsistencies in a line of federal cases and
the state court interpretation attempts to resolve them."
FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE ON ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
The United States Supreme Court was first confronted with the
problem of consensual electronic eavesdropping in On Lee v. United
States." The factual circumstances in On Lee were quite similar to
those in White." The defendant was approached at his own place of
business by an undercover agent who was wearing a transmitting
device. The defendant engaged in conversation with the agent and
made several incriminating statements which were later admitted into
evidence through the testimony of the eavesdropping officers. The
Court, basing its holding on the fact that there was no trespass on
defendant's premises, concluded that such surveillance did not violate
28. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. For instance, the United States Supreme Court's philosophy changed dramatical-
ly twice because of presidential appointments: President Franklin D. Roosevelt's ap-
pointments resulted in a Court majority favorably disposed towards New Deal legisla-
tion and President Richard M. Nixon's four appointments resulted in a retrenchment
from the Warren Court's liberalism.
30. State ex rel. Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978). The court interpreted article
I, section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution to provide broader Miranda coverage in
the case of voluntary detentions than the United States Supreme Court was willing
to provide in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), reasoning that since the Loui-
siana Constitution of 1974 was adopted after Miranda but before Mathiason, the "framers
intended to adopt the Miranda edicts full-blown and unfettered." 359 So. 2d at 590.
31. State v. Reeves appears to fall into this category. See infra text accompanying
notes 37-50.
32. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
33. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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any fourth amendment interest of the defendant." In addition to a
discussion of the common law notion of trespass, however, the Court
made a point of distinguishing traditional wiretapping from the
eavesdropping activity in question. The Court analogized eavesdrop-
ping through a bug planted on an agent to peering at the defendant
from a distance with a pair of binoculars. 5 The Court simply did not
recognize that any privacy interests of the defendant were affected.'
Although the holding in On Lee was not subject to the Court's
serious scrutiny until White, two decisions were rendered in the in-
terim which would ultimately become the bases for the two opposing
views toward consensual surveillance." In Hoffa v. United States,' the
Court examined the situation in which an individual confides in one
who in fact is an undercover agent for the police and who subsequently
testifies against the person at trial. The informant in Hoffa was an
acquaintance of the defendant who had been invited to the defendant's
hotel suite. The defendant argued that the presence of the agent con-
stituted an illegal seizure, since the defendant was not aware that
the person he was speaking to was employed by the police. The Court
rejected the argument, concluding that once an individual voluntarily
confides in another, he can have no expectation that the other person
will not divulge the information to others. 9 The informant in Hoffa
was not wired for sound; the only evidence obtained from this activity
was his own testimony. However, Hoffa established an important
predicate for considering the effect of consensual electronic surveil-
lance: once a person confides in another, he risks disclosure. Given
this premise, the permissibility of consensual electronic surveillance
34. The Court stated that defendant could not raise the trespass issue since "Chin
Poy entered a place of business with the consent, if not by the implied invitation,
of the petitioner [defendant]." The Court in White cited Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) in rejecting the trespass rationale of On Lee. 401 U.S. at 751.
35. After making the analogy, the Court observed that "[it would be dubious ser-
vice to the genuine liberties protected by the Fourth Amendment to make them
bedfellows with spurious liberties improvised by farfetched analogies." 343 U.S. at
754 (emphasis added).
36. Frankfurter's dissent, wherein he decries the surreptitious monitoring,
illustrates that the court's attention was elsewhere. "Of course criminal prosecution
is more than a game. But in any event it should not be deemed to be a dirty game
in which 'the dirty business' of criminals is outwitted by 'the dirty business' of law
officers." Id. at 758.
37. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) noted in White, 401 U.S. at 748-49.
38. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
39. Id. at 302.
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would depend on whether the risk of disclosure includes the risk that
that individual is equipped with a bug."
In White, the Court ultimately concluded that a logical extension
of Hoffa would permit third party monitoring of conversations, pro-
vided the informant consents." Nevertheless, wedged chronologically
between Hoffa and White is the Court's expansive prohibition of war-
rantless wiretapping in Katz v. United States." Katz, although address-
ing an instance of nonconsensual electronic surveillance, 3 introduced
the concept of an individual expectation of privacy as an aspect of
fourth amendment protection. Katz involved the wiretapping of a pay
telephone used by defendant to place bets. In holding that the defend-
ant's communications were protected by the warrant requirement,
the Court announced its view that the fourth amendment "protects
people, not places" and rejected the prior doctrine of a "constitutionally
protected area" as insufficient to delineate the privacy interests
guaranteed by the federal Constitution."' The Court chose to consider
what an individual seeks to preserve as private, and then to deter-
mine whether society would recognize that expectation as reasonable.
This test, which emerged from Justice Harlan's concurrence, suggests
that two factors should be considered in determining whether a con-
stitutional right of privacy exists, so as to come within the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment: (1) whether the individual
possesses an actual (or subjective) expectation of privacy, and (2)
whether the individual's expectation is one that society is prepared
to recognize as "reasonable.""' In Katz, the Court found that an in-
dividual always possesses an expectation of privacy when he enters
a phone booth and locks the door behind him. Likewise, the Court
concluded that society in general regards as reasonable an individual's
expectation of privacy when he purposefully shuts out the public, as
in the case of a phone booth, home, or office.
The first prong of the Katz two-part test suggests that privacy
is at least partially self-determined." An individual, by limiting where
40. This argument was later used by the Louisiana Supreme Court on rehearing
in State v. Reeves. See infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
41. 401 U.S. at 751.
42. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
43. Nonconsensual electronic surveillance occurs when no party to the conversa-
tion is aware of such surveillance. By contrast, when a party to a conversation con-
sents to having a bugging device placed on his person so others may eavesdrop or
record the conversation, the electronic surveillance is called "consensual."
44. 389 U.S. at 351-52.
45. 389 U.S. at 361.
46. Comment, Electronic Eavesdropping and the Right to Privacy, 52 B.U.L. REV.
831, 837 (1972).
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and with whom he speaks, has demonstrated a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy within these limits. Hoffca, by contrast, applies only
an objective standard: if an individual confides in another, he assumes
the risk of subsequent disclosure, regardless of his subjective expec-
tations. Consequently, some inconsistency results when both decisions
are applied to the case of an informant who conceals an electronic
bug. On the one hand, a pure Hoffa analysis would imply a single
presumption that the risk of disclosure includes the risk that the in-
formant is wired for sound. On the other hand, application of Katz
to the same facts would require, as a minimum initial consideration,
a determination of how far the individual's subjective expectation of
privacy extended. The Katz and Hoffa tests might ultimately result
in the same holding, since Katz applies a reasonableness test as well
as a subjective test. Nevertheless, Hoffa, by omitting any considera-
tion of a subjective expectation, represents a more limited view of
privacy interests than Katz.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court relied on Hoffa in resolving the
constitutionality of warrantless electronic consensual surveillance. In
White, the Court held that "the risk of disclosure" described in Hoffa
did include the additional risk that the party with whom a person
converses is transmitting the conversation to government agents and
that such recordings by third parties may be admissible into evidence
against the speaker. 7 The Court did not apply the two-part Katz test;
instead, the Court relied on what could be described as an assump-
tion of the risk to conclude that the defendant possessed no "con-
stitutionally justifiable expectation of privacy.""'
At present, White is the accepted standard for applying the fourth
amendment to instances of consensual electronic surveillance. 9
However, a conflict appears to exist between Katz and White with
regard to the correct approach to evaluating privacy as it is protected
by the fourth amendment. On the one hand, Katz appears to define
the parameters of privacy, at least in part, in terms of an individual's
expectations and his own efforts to exclude others. By contrast, White
would allow this self-determination of privacy to be vitiated by another
individual's consent. Under Katz, a person's actual expectation of
privacy may ultimately be considered unreasonable; however,
reasonableness is an additional standard which balances the degree
of intrusion against social interests advanced by such intrusion. White,
however, de-emphasizes actual expectations and imposes a "reasonable
47. 401 U.S. at 752.
48. Id. at 752-53.
49. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 751 (1979).
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man" standard for expectation of privacy which determines for the
individual what he could reasonably conclude was private."
STATE V. REEVES
The factual circumstances of State v. Reeves5 are quite similar to
those of White. Charles W. Reeves, an employee of the Department
of Elections, was suspected of planning to raise campaign contribu-
tions by means of false expense vouchers. Acting on information
received from Alvin Pilley, a fellow employee of Reeves, state in-
vestigators obtained Pilley's consent to participate in surveillance of
Reeves' conversations and equipped Pilley with an electronic bug. The
investigators then proceeded to intercept three separate conversations
between Reeves and Pilley in October and November of 1979. Subse-
quent to these interceptions, Reeves appeared before a Calcasieu
Parish Grand Jury, where he testified that he had not had any con-
versation regarding false vouchers. Reeves was thereafter indicted
for perjury before the grand jury. At trial, Reeves moved to sup-
press the introduction of the taped recordings of the conversations
with Pilley, arguing that the recordings were made without his con-
sent and without the interposition of a warrant, in violation of the
right to privacy guaranteed by article I, section 5 of the Louisiana
Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, observing that since
article I, section 5 was substantially similar to the fourth amendment,
the holding of White was controlling. Reeves was subsequently con-
victed on October 28, 1980 of two counts of perjury and sentenced
concurrently on each count to six months in jail and fined one thou-
sand dollars.
Reeves on Original Hearing
On original hearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the
warrantless surveillance of Reeves' communications was an invasion
50. The Court stated:
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that
his companions may be reporting to the police. . . . In terms of what his
course will be, what he will or will not do or say, we" are unpersuaded that
he would distinguish between probable informers on the one hand and prob-
able informers with transmitters on the other.
401 U.S. at 752 (emphasis added). The White opinion, in effect, replaces the Katz sub-
jective expectation with a single standard for every instance of consensual electronic
surveillance. Rather than undertaking a case-by-case analysis of an individual's privacy
expectations, White articulates a standard expectation that everyone will be presumed
to possess.
51. See 427 So. 2d 403, 404, 411 (1983).
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of privacy prohibited by article I, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion of 1974. The court's justification for interpreting article I, sec-
tion 5 more broadly than the fourth amendment rested on the tex-
tual differences between the two provisions and the intent of the
drafters which inspired such differences. As additional support for
its decision, the court examined the jurisprudence of other states
whose constitutions have been held to contain guarantees of privacy
broader than the fourth amendment.
Textual Analysis of Article I, Section 5
The court began by examining the literal language of the state
constitutional provision. Article I, section 5 provides:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, com-
munications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall
issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the
persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or
reason for the search. Any person adversely affected by a
search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall
have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
This language is substantially similar to article I, section 7 of the Loui-
siana Constitution of 192152 (which in turn is nearly identical to the fourth
amendment), with the exception of the automatic standing provision in
the last sentence and the inclusion of the words "communications" and
"invasions of privacy" in the first. The Reeves court maintained that the
addition of the terms "communications" and "invasions of privacy" affir-
52. Article I, section 7 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no such search or seizure shall be made except upon warrant therefor issued
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The 1921 Provision should be compared with the corresponding provision in article
VII of the Louisiana Constitution of 1913, a verbatim transcription of the fourth
amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and
no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
Identical language was used in earlier Louisiana constitutions. LA. CONST. of 1898, art.
VII; LA. CONST. of 1879, art. II; LA. CONST. of 1868, art. CVII. Interestingly, no analogous
provision existed in the pre-civil war constitution of 1852.
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matively established a right to privacy in a person's communications.
In support of this conclusion, the court adopted the following
rationale: (1) formerly, under article I, section 7 of the Louisiana Con-
stitution of 1921, the expressly protected areas of the home, person,
property, and effects could not be invaded without a warrant based
upon probable cause; (2) article I, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion of 1974 has specifically elevated "communications" to the status
of a protected interest; (3) therefore, no communications may be in-
tercepted except by means of a warrant. The argument is well crafted,
and if one is willing to accept the first two premises, the third must
follow. The problem lies in accepting the initial premises. The war-
rant requirement, although always the basic protective device in search
and seizure situations, has never been constitutionally compelled,
either under the Louisiana Constitution or the fourth amendment,
except where the search and seizure has been declared unreasonable.'
Neither the fourth amendment nor article I, section 5 contains any
statement that the term "unreasonable" is equivalent to "no warrant."
The second sentence of article I, section 5, which states that "no war-
rant shall issue without probable cause," does not state that a war-
rant is required in every situation. Likewise, the court's second
premise-that communications were elevated to a "protected interest"
not subject to any type of balancing process-assumes that by add-
ing the word "communications," the drafters intended without reser-
vation that the search and seizure jurisprudence apply to all war-
rantless invasions of private communications. However, this assump-
tion is questionable in light of the inclusion in section 5 of the adjec-
tive "unreasonable" before "invasions of privacy." The presence of
''unreasonable" as a modifier suggests two important propositions:
first, that the court must inquire into the nature of unreasonableness
when an invasion of privacy is alleged;" second, that such an analysis
53. In article I, section 7 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, the critical language
was the word "unreasonable." To invoke the protections of article I, section 7 (and
for the warrant requirement to apply), a search had to be considered "unreasonable."
Clearly, a search conducted with probable cause under exigent circumstances satisfied
the "reasonableness" test. See State v. Bourg, 248 La. 844, 182 So. 2d 510 (1966).
54. See infra text accompanying note 58.
55. One contemporary chronicler of the 1973 Louisiana Constitutional Convention's
work observed:
The key element is that the invasions of privacy must be unreasonable to
merit constitutional protection, and the courts are given flexibility to deter-
mine which invasions of privacy are supported by sufficient societal interests
to be considered reasonable. In this inquiry, the courts are guided by the
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might appropriately read greater individual freedoms into each pro-
vision than similar provisions of the United States Constitution. In
its pursuit of the latter goal, the court on original hearing neglected
to make the initial examination of reasonableness. The court opted
instead for a questionable formula establishing a constitutionally com-
pelled warrant requirement, though such a formula finds no support
in either the language of section 5 or prior search and seizure
jurisprudence.
The Intent of the Drafters
Though additional text might not of itself entirely justify a par-
ticular interpretation, a court may call upon the legislative history
of a provision to substantiate its reading of the language. Consequent-
ly, the court looked to the language of the Bill of Rights and the
records of the Elections Committee of the Constitutional Convention
of 1973 to determine what types of communications were protected
by the warrant requirement. The court noted the drastic first draft
of section 5, which provided that: "No law shall permit the intercep-
tion or inspection of any private communication or message. ' ' This
outright ban on all types of electronic surveillance, the court concluded,
was indicative of the committee's heightened concern about invasions
of communications, and it demonstrated the desire of committee
members to greatly increase the guarantees of the Louisiana Con-
stitution in this area. However, the first draft was rejected and re-
placed by a provision that, according to the court, placed "communica-
tions on an equal footing with other expressly protected interests and
[interposed] the requirement of a warrant before any interception can
be conducted."57 In support of this conclusion, the opinion refers to
the following colloquy between committee members:
Mr. Vick:
I just have a point of information. The way you have
it now, it would allow under certain circumstances, and
with a court order, wire tapping.
purpose of the convention in expanding the individual's protections in the
area beyond the existing law.
Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L.
REV. 1, 21 (1974).
56. DOCUMENTS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: RELATIVE
TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, April 17, 1973 at 1201 [hereinafter cited
as DOCUMENTS].
57. 427 So. 2d at 405-06.
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Mr. Guarisco:
Yes, it would.
Mr. Guarisco:
Let me make this comment, that before we adopted
"communications" you could do it without a warrant.
Now we are at least requiring a warrant to do it. So
we have improved upon it.'
The statement of delegate Guarisco, when viewed in isolation, could
conceivably lend support to the court's position. However, such an
interpretation is questionable for several reasons. First of all, the ques-
tion of whether consensual bugging should be included as an unrea-
sonable invasion of private communications was never discussed by
the committee. Further, almost every reference to the warrant re-
quirement as it affected communications was addressed to the issue
of wiretapping. The court displayed no interest in the transcription
of the debate over the first draft; however, one exchange between
delegate Guarisco and a testifying law professor tends to limit the
scope of Guarisco's statement:
Dr. Shieber:
[A]nd I think if this committee and the convention
adopt language which is similar to that of the federal
constitution, the courts would say that they were going
along knowing . . . they were going along with the
federal interpretation.
Mr. Stinson:
Why should we put it in [referring to communications]?
Mr. Guarisco:
Why make a mistake about it? It won't hurt to put
it in.
Dr. Shieber:
All right sir, I agree, but the last sentence should be
eliminated. 9
The above exchange indicates more of a desire to incorporate the
fourth amendment jurisprudence on wiretapping (presumably Katz),
by including the word communications, than to place all communica-
tions on a protected level, as the Reeves court (on original hearing)
determined.
58. DOCUMENTS at 917 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 905.
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Clearly, no discussion ever occurred as to the potential applica-
tion of the provision to a Reeves situation; in all likelihood, there was
no consensus on the degree to which communications would be pro-
tected. Even the most fervent opponent of electronic surveillance
among the committee members could only aspire that "when we put
in this language, 'invasion of privacy,' given our new supreme court
in this state, I think the courts are going to take care of things real
well. I really do."' Such a pronouncement reinforces the notion that
the provision is purposefully vague in defining certain terms and
dispels the court's conclusion that the drafters considered that sec-
tion 5 necessarily imposed a blanket warrant requirement upon all
interceptions of communications.
The choice of textual dissimilarities as a rationale for interpreting
state constitutions, as aforementioned, presents much less difficulty
than a complete re-examination of federal doctrine." Nonetheless, an
argument based on text ought to be supported by legitimate inferences
from wording and sentence structure, as well as by the drafter's in-
tent. Examined in this light, the court's choice appears ill-advised,
both because of the absence of dispositive language in section 5 and
the lack of any clear legislative intent in the records of the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1973.
As its survey of other state court jurisprudence indicates, the
court might have simply cited the textual differences as a basis for
re-examining the reasoning of White itself." The court in Reeves cited
the consitutions of four other states" which contain affirmative recogni-
tion of a right to privacy and which have been interpreted by the
respective state supreme courts as forbidding warrantless electronic
surveillance "even when one of the parties to the conversation con-
sents to the surveillance." ' In addition, the court discussed the
Michigan Constitution's search and seizure provision, which is nearly
identical to the fourth amendment, and noted that the Michigan
60. Id. at 917 (Mr. Jenkins, speaking).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 41-50.
63. 427 So. 2d at 406-07. ALASKA CONST. art. I, S 22 (1956, added 1972) ("The right
of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed."); FLA. CONST. art.
I, S 12 (1968, amended 1982) (emphasis added) ("The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and against the unreasonable interception of private communication by any means,
shall not be violated."); HAWAII CONST. art. I, S 5 (1950, amended 1968) (protects against
"invasion of privacy"); MONT. CONST. art. II, S 10 ("The right of individual privacy is essen-
tial to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing
of a compelling state interest.").
64. Reeves. 427 So. 2d at 406-07.
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Supreme Court nevertheless construed the provision to forbid war-
rantless bugging even though one party consents.
65
The reasoning of other states' jurisprudence is quite instructive
when compared to Reeves itself. In State v. Brackman," the Montana
Supreme Court noted the additional language in the Montana Con-
stitution on the right to privacy, as did the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Reeves. Unlike Reeves, Brackman moves from the initial language
difference between state and federal constitutions to a detailed ex-
amination of the reasoning in White, resuming the debate over whether
a nonconsenting party has a justifiable expectation of privacy when
the other party has consented to the bugging. In deciding what ex-
pectations of privacy were protected by its constitution, the Montana
Supreme Court weighed "what effect a decision favorable to the defen-
dant would have on law enforcement abilities against this intrusion
of privacy and what consequent effect that may have on freedom of
speech." 7 The Alaska, Florida, and Hawaii decisions cited by the court
in Reeves ultimately rely on similar balancing tests, even though
originally resting their holdings on the specific inclusion of a right
to privacy." In this regard, the court in Reeves might well have looked
to their opinions, not only for support for the proposition that greater
rights may be inferred from state constitutions, but for insight into
the appropriate analysis for inferring such rights.
Reeves on Rehearing
On rehearing, the court reversed its prior findings and held that
although the intercepted conversations of the defendant were com-
munications within the meaning of article I, section 5, the manner
in which the conversations were monitored did not constitute an "in-
vasion of privacy." The court observed that the addition of the terms
"communications" and "invasion of privacy" to an otherwise identical
restatement of the fourth amendment required the court to deter-
mine the extent to which these terms might enlarge the protection
from warrantless electronic surveillance provided by the fourth amend-
ment. The court considered whether the defendant's conversations
65. Id. at 407. The court cited People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511
(1975). However, the Michigan Supreme Court noted: "We do not address those situa-
tions which include ... the use of an electronic device by a third party only to eavesdrop
upon a conversation between two parties, one of whom is cooperating with the
authorities." 393 Mich. at 562-63 n.2, 227 N.W.2d at 514 n.2.
66. 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978).
67. 582 at 1221.
68. See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978) (the Alaska Supreme Court
adopted the Harlan test in Katz of an actual expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable); State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981).
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were "communications" within the meaning of article I, section 5, and
whether the manner in which the conversations were intercepted con-
stituted an "invasion of privacy."69
Communications
After observing that no jurisprudence existed which could pro-
vide guidance, the court began its examination of the term "com-
munications" by reviewing the transcripts of the constitutional
convention."0 The court concluded that the committee members had
included the word in order that "each person's communications would
be free from unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy." 1
Thus, the court's analysis is essentially textual; because "communica-
tions" is accompanied by no modifier, the drafters obviously meant
all communications. Further, because "communications" is placed along
with other areas traditionally protected from unreasonable searches
and seizures, all communications are protected by the warrant require-
ment. Thus, the court concluded that Reeves' communications were
of the type protected under article I, section 5.
Invasion of Privacy
Examining the transcripts of the convention, the court found
nothing which would reveal a clear intent as to the meaning of "inva-
sion of privacy.""2 Observing that "invasion of privacy" is an elusive
term, the court expressly refused to define privacy as a general con-
cept, but confined itself to defining invasion of privacy in terms of
consensual electronic surveillance. This limited determination, the court
suggested, avoided "the almost impossible task" of defining privacy.
Bereft of any Louisiana constitutional jurisprudence upon which
to rely in examining the effect of consensual electronic surveillance
upon a person's privacy interests, the court turned to the federal
jurisprudence. The court expressed agreement with the result reached
in Whit7 but declined to employ its rationale. Instead, the court chose
to examine the effect of consensual electronic monitoring upon privacy
by applying the two-part test of Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz. 5
69. -427 So. 2d at 412.
70. Id. at 412-14.
71. Id. at 413.
72. Id. at 413-14. Interestingly, the court did not discuss whether the invasion
of privacy at issue was "unreasonable" but treated the word "communications" as if
it were modified only by the term "invasion of privacy." See infra note 86.
73. 427 So. 2d at 414.
74. Id. at 416.
75. "My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that
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The court concluded that Reeves exhibited no actual expectation of
privacy which could be invaded.
The court demonstrated Reeves' lack of a subjective expectation
of privacy by posing three hypothetical situations. In the first
hypothetical, the informant Pilley did not act as an agent, but volun-
tarily reported his conversation with Reeves to the police. The court
pointed out that Reeves could have no expectation that Pilley would
not go to the police, since a person is always aware that his confidence
may be violated after a conversation. In the next hypothetical, Pilley
acted as an agent of the police but carried no electronic device. The
court observed that the risk of disclosure presented in this situation
is identical to that presented in the first hypothetical."
As the third "hypothetical," the court described the actual cir-
cumstances of Reeves: Pilley was acting as an agent of the police and
was equipped with a bugging device. The same risk of disclosure is
presented in the last situation, the court concluded, because "the risk
of disclosure includes the manner of disclosure.""
The court refused to distinguish between situations in which only
two parties are present and those in which a third party is present
via an electronic monitor. According to the court, "disclosure could
take any form .... [Speculation] as to which form of disclosure a per-
son risks and which one he does not anticipate when entering into
a conversation . .. is result oriented."78 The opinion suggests that
once a party has disclosed to another person, he has no control over
further disclosure through the medium of the person in whom he has
confided.
Finally, the court declared that, assuming Reeves would have
possessed an actual expectation of privacy, it was not an expectation
which society ought to recognize as "reasonable." Reasoning that
society's interest rests in exposing truth, rather than in concealing
it, the court observed that an electronic transmitter simply tapes what
was in fact said and preserves for later ears a more accurate, unbias-
ed record than would be possible through the testimony from memory
of a participant in the conversation. The court discounted the
"speculative" claim of a chilling effect which might result from war-
rantless consensual surveillance, and observed that in the ten years
there is a two-fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " 389 U.S. at 361.
76. 427 So. 2d at 417.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id.
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since the White decision was rendered no perceptible effect on freedom
of discourse has been demonstrated.
CRITICISM
The court on rehearing initially recognized the textual differences
between the state and federal constitutions. Unquestionably, the
strongest basis for interpreting a state constitutional provision more
broadly than its federal counterpart is the presence of additional or
different language"9 which, on the surface, indicates the inclusion of
greater rights. The court correctly recognized that simply reversing
its prior holding and applying federal jurisprudence without examin-
ing the purpose for the additional language in section 5 would not
adequately resolve the problem."
The two-step analysis employed by the court to determine if there
had been a communication and, if so, an invasion of privacy seems
logical at first. Upon closer scrutiny, however, the value of the test
as a means for analyzing the problem of consensual surveillance
becomes suspect. The court had no difficulty in determining that the
term "communications," without limitation or modification, clearly
means all communications. The court in its second step attempted to
address the problem by determining whether there had been an inva-
sion of privacy. The problem with this approach, insofar as it pur-
ports to be a separate, state-defined test, rests in the total absence
of any state jurisprudence or legislative history which may be of use
in defining "invasion of privacy."8 The court instead returned to the
federal standards for measuring the right to privacy, suggesting that
the two-part test was not a test at all, but rather a means of steering
the inquiry into consensual surveillance back into more familiar federal
waters.
Given the different approaches taken by Hoffa and Katz,82 the
court's decision to rely on federal authorities raises the issue of which
standard to apply. The court, interestingly enough, chose to apply
the Harlan test expressed in Katz.3 The selection of the Katz test
79. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
80. Furthermore, since the court was reversing itself, the issue of the additional
language was too well defined to simply ignore without considered argument.
81. 427 So. 2d at 414.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
83. "However, we choose not to adopt the analysis of the Supreme Court in White.
Rather, we prefer to follow our previous decisions and examine the effect of the con-
stitutional guarantee against 'invasions of privacy' on consensual electronic surveillance
in light of the test articulated by Justice Harlan in Katz." 427 So. 2d at 416.
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is particularly unexpected after the opinion's lengthy elaboration (and
ultimate approbation) of the holding in White. Possibly, the court felt
that if the case were resolved by applying a Katz rationale rather
than the White approach, future critics could not dispute the correct-
ness of White as a basis for reexamining Reeves. By thus embracing
the "expectation of privacy" approach of Katz, the court could main-
tain that in molding its policy towards consensual electronic
surveillance, it had given full consideration to the privacy interests
reflected in section 5.
However, it is unclear whether the court is actually applying the
Katz test. The court's announcement that Reeves possessed no actual
expectation of privacy is premised on the three hypothetical situa-
tions posed by the court and the corresponding risks of disclosure
in each. However, the reasoning is nearly identical to the reasoning
in White. By stating that the risk of disclosure includes the manner
of disclosure, the court has essentially equated the White test of a
"constitutionally justifiable expectation of privacy" with the Katz re-
quirement of an actual expectation of privacy, and determined that
neither were satisfied in Reeves' case. Such a determination resolves
the issue without ever considering whether the expectation harbored
by Reeves was one which society would recognize as reasonable. By
avoiding a reasonableness inquiry, the court is not forced to consider
the problem in light of the traditional conflicting values of societal
interest in law enforcement and the individual's personal privacy
interests. These considerations inevitably accompany discussion of a war-
rant requirement although they are dealt with by courts uncomfortably
at best. Nevertheless, if Katz stands for the proposition that privacy
interests are in part self-determined, then the initial disposition of the
case on the grounds that Reeves lacked an actual expectation of privacy
is incorrect."' The whole purpose of establishing an actual expectation
of privacy is to ascertain the degree of disclosure a person is con-
templating when he speaks. The court, however, abjures drawing lines
between different forms of disclosure on the grounds that such distinc-
tions are "result oriented." The thrust of the court's position is that while
it is appropriate for the court to discern an actual expectation of privacy
from external acts manifesting an intent to obtain privacy (such as enter-
ing a phone booth), it is not proper to base such an expectation on the
unverifiable thoughts entertained by an individual concerning the degree
to which his conversation will be disclosed. The implication that the
average citizen appreciates the risk of disclosure via a government
84. See the concurrence of Justice Harlan in Katz, 389 U.S. at 360.
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bugging device each time he engages in a private conversation is ques-
tionable. Certainly, most adults are conscious of the possibility that their
conversations may be tape recorded by the individuals with whom they
converse. However, it is equally certain that when an individual speaks
privately to only one person, he does not expect that a third party such
as the government is monitoring the conversation. The court indicates
that such an interpretation is speculative; however, what could more
readily evidence an expectation of privacy than a deliberate attempt to
limit the number of parties to a conversation?'
By focusing its attention on the first prong of the Katz test and
concluding that Reeves did not possess an actual expectation of
privacy, the court was able to avoid basing its opinion on whether
Reeves' expectation was one society would recognize as reasonable."
The court concluded in dicta that the expectation was not reasonable,
since the tape recording furthered the societal interest in discover-
ing the truth.' The importance of discovering the truth is a vital policy
consideration which should be included in a reasonableness determina-
tion. However, the opinion fails to recognize that "truth," as an ab-
solute value, is often sacrificed in search and seizure cases in favor
of countervailing considerations of privacy.' The statement that society
seeks to discover the truth is not enough; to effect a reasonableness
determination, a court must consider the individual interest encroached
upon in addition to the needs of effective law enforcement and the
difficulty of procuring a warrant. 9 Wiretapping, like consensual
surveillance, is a reliable source of truth, and arguably an invaluable
aid in combatting organized crime." Nevertheless, a warrant is re-
85. Cf. White, 401 U.S. at 756 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Greenwalt, The Consent
Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring With the Consent
of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 189, 218 (1968); Comment, supra
note 46, at 838-39.
86. Cf. "Although the Constitution expressly protects 'communications' against
'unreasonable invasions of privacy,' the real issue is whether the presence of the sur-
reptitiously invited electronic 'third ear' . . . is an unreasonable invasion of the speaker's
privacy, without the establishment of probable cause and prior judicial approval of
its presence." 427 So. 2d at 419 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
87. See supra text accompanying note 78.
88. As a practical matter, the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence will often
result in the acquittal of a defendant whose guilt might have been demonstrated by
the evidence. See generally Gilday, The Exclusionary Rule: Down and Almost Out, 4
N. Ky. L. REV. 1 (1977); Note, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Congressional Assault on
Mapp v. Ohio, 61 GEo. L.J. 1453 (1973).
89. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1963).
90. See generally Shieber, Electronic Surveillance, The Mafia and Individual Freedom,
42 LA. L. REV. 1323 (1982).
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quired before a wiretap can constitutionally be used.9"
A traditional reasonableness inquiry would attempt to balance the
interests of the individual against those of society. In this instance,
the individual's interest is his right to be free from intrusion upon
his privacy, while society's interest is in controlling and deterring the
criminal activity which threatens individual freedoms." Thus, to deter-
mine whether warrantless one-party consensual bugging is an
unreasonable invasion of privacy, it is necessary to consider the
activity's impact on privacy and the effect a prohibition of this activity
would have on integral aspects of law enforcement.
The individual's interest in privacy cannot be undervalued. In-
dividual privacy allows a person the freedom to move in society free
from constant public scrutiny. Privacy is of course critical to the
development of individuality; it permits emotional and intellectual
development by allowing a person to say things which he would not
say in public.93 The unfettered use of warrantless, consensual bug-
ging could severely and adversely impact both the individual and
society. Uncontrolled surveillance could constrain the individual from
speaking his mind, thus chilling his freedom to think independently
.without fear of public exposure. The importance of preserving an area
in which one need not conform to public expectations has been
recognized, by Justices Brandeis and Douglas among others, as simp-
ly "the right to be let alone."94 As Justice Douglas urged in his dis-
sent in White: "Free discourse . . . may be frivolous or serious, hum-
ble or defiant, reactionary or revolutionary, profane or in good taste;
but it is not free if there is surveillance."" The impact on society
is conceivably even greater. Warrantless, indiscriminate bugging could
stifle autonomy of thought and become a tool of repression by a more
authoritarian government. As the population becomes increasingly
aware of noteworthy instances of surveillance, it may come to fear
that it is not safe to confide in anyone."
91. Louisiana Electronic Surveillance Act, LA. R.S. 15:1301-:1312 (1981).
92. See Shieber, supra note 90, at 1324.
93. For a discussion of the values which are generally associated with privacy,
see Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 587 (1977).
94. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
95. 401 U.S. at 762 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas' allusion to the first
amendment right to freedom of speech typifies his view of privacy as an agglomera-
tion of first, fourth, and fifth amendment values. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965). Conceivably, in adopting article I, section 5, the drafters of the Louisiana
Constitution may have had in mind a broader philosophical basis for the right than
simply the fourth amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
drafters may have attempted to give one aspect of Justice Douglas' penumbral right
to privacy a more concrete existence in the Louisiana Constitution.
96. Greenwalt, supra note 85, at 218.
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Proponents of bugging in the area of law enforcement argue, quite
persuasively, that we do not live in a police state, and that the war-
rantless monitoring which does take place is invariably directed at
law breakers and not at the average citizen. 7 This argument, however
accurate, overlooks the key notion behind the warrant requirment:
that the protection of individual rights is best left to the discretion
of a neutral, detached magistrate rather than the (justifiably) biased
law enforcement officer. Such an argument fails to recognize that the
overriding purpose behind most of the Bill of Rights guarantees is
to prevent future abuse of certain freedoms, as well as to provide pre-
sent protection.
On the other hand, a prohibition of warrantless, one-party con-
sensual bugging would not appear to impose serious restraints on
effective law enforcement. The same activity could be undertaken pur-
suant to a judicially approved warrant, avoiding the charge that the
activity was undertaken indiscriminately and without probable cause.
Certainly, in most cases (including Reeves) no exigent circumstances
exist which would make procuring a warrant impracticable. 8 The war-
rant requirement functions as a limit on the number of intrusions on
privacy and ideally protects innocent citizens from the harrassment
of government eavesdropping.9
97. Justice Lemmon, in his concurrence in Reeves, suggests that the legislature,
in enacting the Louisiana Electronic Surveillance Act (which explicitly exempts con-
sensual electronic surveillance from its coverage), did not feel that consensual monitoring
was an unreasonable invasion of privacy. Should public sentiment determine in the
future that consensual electronic surveillance is an unreasonable invasion of privacy,
the proper solution might be, as Justice Lemmon suggests, amendment of the act by
the legislature to require a warrant for such surveillance. See 427 So. 2d at 419-20
(Lemmon, J., concurring).
98. One concern voiced by law enforcement officials is the need for quick action
when an informant arranges a drug transaction with little advance warning. To deprive
the police the right to bug might jeopardize the conviction, if the case rests in part
on the nature of the verbal transaction. Arguably, this situation would justify an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement, since both probable cause and exigent circumstances
would exist.
99. The discussion thus far has been couched in terms of warrant versus no war-
rant. Conceivably, a middle ground might exist in instances where police or govern-
ment investigators are attempting to crack a large criminal operation but lack infor-
mation amounting to probable cause with respect to the particular individuals involved.
In this situation, "reasonableness" under article I, section 5 might be satisfied by some
type of judicial approval based on less than probable cause. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (Powell suggests that
area warrants for particular roads or particular times in the case of border searches
would satisfy fourth amendment standards of reasonableness.); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (exception
to probable cause requirement for warrants in cases of administrative searches or
inspections). Such an approach arguably allows law enforcement to conduct activity
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CONCLUSION
The two opinions in Reeves are both an encouragement and a disap-
pointment. Quite significantly, the court has endeavored to address
a provision of the Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974 as a separate guarantor of individual liberties rather than as
a mirrored restatement of the Bill of Rights. The court examined the
text, legislative history, and federal antecedents to the provision under
scrutiny in its effort to determine what, if any, extension of rights
beyond the fourth amendment was contemplated by the drafters of
the 1974 constitution. Ultimately, however, the court concluded that,
though the words "communications" and "invasions of privacy" were
intentionally added to the traditional fourth amendment language, the
additional language provided no additional protection.'0 This result
is unfortunate, particularly since the phrasing of section 5 appears
to offer an opportunity to re-examine a federal attitude toward privacy
which is inconsistent with prior federal jurisprudence. 10
Several aspects of the court's foray into state constitutional in-
terpretation are instructive. The court's original opinion demonstrates
an awareness of the proper sources that might provide a gloss on
the general language of a constitution, such as the legislative history
of the provisions and contemporaneous constructions of other state
constitutions. Unfortunately, in its decision to utilize the former fac-
tor, the court proceeded to find a legislative intent where none could
clearly be demonstrated.' The net result was an opinion unsupported
by a sound textual, historical, or policy argument and which was
destined not to survive rehearing. When the court desires to reex-
amine the policy behind a controversial rule, such as that in White,
it ought to do so openly on policy grounds when the legislative intent
necessary to disrupt large scale criminal operations while at the same time interpos-
ing some type of judicial oversight on police activity. The problem with such an ap-
proach, however, is one of line drawing; once an exception to probable cause for a
warrant is made, it becomes difficult and perhaps arbitrary to distinguish between in-
stances where probable cause is required and where it is not required.
100. The concurrence by Justice Lemmon suggests a limitation on the absolute
rule of the majority opinion. "Moreover, this decision merely holds that probable cause
and a warrant are not absolute requirements for interception of communications. Whether
there was an 'unreasonable ... invasion of privacy' must be determined in each case."
427 So. 2d at 420 (Lemmon, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Lemmon goes
on to suggest that the opinion should be read in light of the factual situation it
addresses; this suggestion implies that reasonableness is still a factor, despite the ma-
jority's construction of subjective expectations of privacy.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
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is ambiguous or nonexistent. To do otherwise undermines the integrity
of the court's analysis and casts doubt on the propriety of a broader
state constitutional interpretation.
The court on rehearing displayed more discretion in selecting tools
by which to interpret article I, section 5. Commendably, the court
recognized the dichotomy between Katz and White and attempted to
reconcile the federal jurisprudence to achieve a result consistent with
the supplemental language in section 5. Lamentably, the opinion on
rehearing does not achieve this lofty goal. Instead, the opinion declares
that by adding the words "communications" and "invasions of privacy,"
the drafters of the constitution created a provision requiring applica-
tion of the Katz test in a manner providing less protection than that
provided by the application of the same test under the fourth amend-
ment. If the court was determined, as it seems that it was, to return
to the White standard, it might have done so by simply stating that
the additional words meant nothing and that the Louisiana standard
for consensual surveillance is coextensive with the federal standard.
The court, however, apparently recognized that the extra language
did mean something, for it felt constrained to interpret the language
so as to negate the implications which were so obvious to the court
on original hearing. In so doing, the court bypassed an opportunity
to impose a uniform warrant requirement on all invasions of com-
munications, a result which would have been consistent with both the
language of the Louisiana constitution and the expectations of the
average citizen.
Jon Wesley Wise
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